torts 

Chapter 8

DUTY IN NEGLIGENCE CASES

 

§ 8.01  Overview [118-119]

 

The element of duty establishes that there is a legally recognized relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff that obligates the defendant to act (or to refrain from acting) in a certain manner toward the plaintiff.  Whether a duty exists is often a policy-based determination and, thus, it is left to a judge to make the determination of whether a duty exists.  The duty concept has been expanding to the point that now one engaged in risk-creating conduct generally owes a duty to avoid causing foreseeable personal injuries to foreseeable plaintiffs.

 

§ 8.02  Nonfeasance [119-140]

 

Typically, there is no duty owed in a nonfeasance context.  Nonfeasance is generally the failure to intervene to confer a benefit upon another.  Misfeasance often consists of affirmative acts of risk-creating conduct, doing something that a reasonable person would not do. Misfeasance can also be shown by a negligent omission – failing to do something that a reasonable person would have done. Either risk-creating affirmative acts or negligent omissions generally lead to the finding of a duty. A defendant who is sued based on his nonfeasance has not created the risks that ultimately injure the plaintiff; rather, the defendant has failed to prevent harm caused by some other source from occurring.

 

Typically, nonfeasance-based actions arise where the plaintiff contends that the defendant should have intervened to rescue the plaintiff, or where the claim is that the defendant should have prevented harm to the plaintiff by controlling a third party or by taking measures to protect the plaintiff from injury.  Courts will find a duty in these contexts only in limited situations.

 

            [A] Duty to Rescue

 

The clear general rule remains that a person does not have a duty to aid another. Courts consistently have refused to require a stranger to render assistance, even where the person could have rendered aid with little risk or effort.  There are a variety of reasons given for the law's no-duty-to-rescue rule (e.g., the value of individualism and the unworkability of a rule requiring rescue).  The no-duty-to-rescue rule, nonetheless, has been powerfully criticized as devaluing human life and celebrating selfishness. Discomfort with the rule has led courts to fashion various exceptions.

 

                        [1] Creating the Peril   

 

A well-established exception to the no-duty-to-rescue rule applies when the need for rescue arises because of the defendant's negligence.  Also, some jurisdictions have found an exception where a person's fault-free conduct gives rise to the need to rescue.  Indeed, there is movement toward imposing rescue obligations on those who are connected in any way to the need for rescue.

 

                        [2] Special Relationships

 

Courts have imposed a duty to rescue when justified by a “special relationship” between the parties such as a common carrier-passenger, innkeeper-guest and ship captain-seaman.  There seems to be a movement to find a duty to aid or protect in any relation of dependence or of mutual dependence.”

 

                        [3] Undertaking to Act and Reliance

 

While people generally have no obligation to intervene, once they do, a duty arises. There are different views about the extent of the obligation: under the traditional view, once a person undertakes to rescue, he must not leave the victim in a worse position; under the more modern view, the rescuer is obligated to act reasonably once he has begun to act.  Closely related to the undertaking to act concept is the concept of reliance. Courts have found a duty where the defendant caused the plaintiff to rely on promised aid.

 

                        [4] Contract

 

Occasionally, a rescue obligation arises from contract. There is debate about the extent to which a defendant's gratuitous promise, without more, gives rise to a duty. 

 

            [B] Duty to Control and Protect

 

A person typically is not legally obligated to control the conduct of another or to take steps to protect another from harm.

 

                        [1] Control

 

While generally a person has no obligation to control another person's conduct to prevent harm to a third person, exceptions arise where there is a special relationship. The relationships giving rise to a duty to control require some relationship between the defendant and the third party, combined with knowledge (actual or constructive) of the need for control. There can be substantial debate about which relationships give rise to a duty to control.

 

                                    [a] Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California

 

Probably the most famous duty-to-control case is Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, [551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)] in which the plaintiffs asserted that the defendant therapist had a duty to warn them or their daughter of threats made by the psychotherapist's patient. Jurisdictions have overwhelmingly adopted the Tarasoff rationale with differences about its application. In some jurisdictions, the duty to warn extends only to “readily identifiable victims,” while in others all foreseeable victims must be warned.

 

                                    [b] Suppliers of Liquor

 

At common law, neither sellers of liquor nor social hosts were liable to those injured by those to whom they served alcohol. Courts and legislatures have been reconsidering this common law view. Several have imposed liability on commercial suppliers of liquor. A few went further and determined that a social host could be liable to a third party injured by a drunken guest. These decisions are controversial and raise complex policy issues.

 

                                    [c] Negligent Entrustment

 

Negligent entrustment cases involve misfeasance by the defendant. The defendant's liability is premised on supplying a potentially dangerous instrumentality (such as a car or gun) to a person the defendant knows or should know is not fit to handle it.

 

            [2] Duty to Protect

 

As a general principle, there is no obligation to protect another from harm. Where, however, the defendant and plaintiff stand in a relationship in which the latter has ceded the ability for self-protection, the former has a duty to make reasonable efforts to protect the latter.

 

                                    [a] Landlord Duty to Protect

 

A landlord/tenant relationship may trigger a duty to protect, provided there is enough foreseeability of harm and it is supported by public policy.

 

                                    [b] Business Duty to Protect

 

Jurisdictions differ on how to treat cases of assault on patrons of a business.  The business-patron relationship is rarely enough to itself establish a duty. Courts typically require a high degree of foreseeability to establish a duty. How high is subject to some debate. Some courts require that the plaintiff show evidence of “prior, similar incidents” before a duty to protect can be found. Others look more broadly at the “totality of the circumstances,” while others balance the degree of foreseeability and the burden of protection. Ultimately, whether a duty to protect should be owed is a determination of public policy.

 

                                    [c] Police Duty to Protect and the Public Duty Doctrine

 

Special duty issues often arise when the plaintiff seeks to recover from a government entity. Under the “public duty doctrine,” a government actor performing improperly is not usually liable to individuals harmed by the misperformance, because any duty owed is limited to the public at large rather than to any specific individual.

 

                                                [i] Police Duty

 

Police departments are typically not liable for failing to protect individual citizens because of separation of power concerns by the courts. Most courts fear that if they recognize a duty of protection, they would inevitably be determining how the limited police resources of the community should be allocated. In order for there to be a duty to protect in a police case, then, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant police undertook to act and created reliance, enlisted the aid of the plaintiff, or increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff. Some courts have created additional narrow exceptions.

 

                                                [ii] The Public Duty Doctrine in Other Contexts

 

The public duty doctrine has been applied to limit duty in contexts other than that of the police, such as to fire departments. Some courts have gone so far as to refuse to find a duty owing from a government-run common carrier sued for its failure to protect passengers from third-party harm or to permit the questioning of a school district's decision about where to place school bus stops. The public duty doctrine has been much criticized as an attempt to resurrect governmental immunity in contexts where it ostensibly has been abolished. It has also been seen as unfairly placing the burden of loss on the few innocent victims of government error, and as creating a disincentive for government to use care in carrying out its functions.

 

§ 8.03   The Limits of the Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Distinction [140]

 

The misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction is not the “be all and end all” of duty analysis. Rather, there are cases where the classification of the conduct in issue is secondary to policy concerns. One example is the famous case of H.R. Moch Co., Inc.v. Rensselaer Water Co. [159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928)], in which the plaintiff suffered property damage because the defendant water company, who had contracted with the city to supply water to the city's fire hydrants, failed to do so. The decision sought to limit the scope of the defendant's liability, possibly out of the recognition that water, as a necessity, must be kept affordable. Indeed, the Moch rationale has been followed in cases of obvious misfeasance where there are concerns about excessive liability.

 

§ 8.04  The Foreseeable Plaintiff Requirement [140-143]

 

Absent some other basis for limiting the scope of duty, the defendant owes a duty to foreseeable victims for foreseeable harm.  Thus, in order to establish a duty, the plaintiff must show that defendant's negligence created foreseeable risks of harm to persons in her position. The concept that the scope of duty is limited to a foreseeable plaintiff arises out of one of the most famous cases in American law, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. [162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)]. The case remains important for the debate it raises about how to place limitations on the scope of liability.

 

§ 8.05  Conclusion [143-144]

Chapter 9

LAND OCCUPIER DUTY

 

§ 9.01 Overview [145-146]

 

Under the common law approach, the measure of the duty owed depends on the status of the person entering the land – whether the entrant is a “trespasser,” a “licensee,” or an “invitee.” The status of the person entering the land determines the standard of care owed by the land occupier. Some jurisdictions have rejected the status approach to liability, using a generalized duty of ordinary care instead.

 

§ 9.02 The Common Law Status Approach [146-155]

 

The common law approach to landowner liability measures the duty owed by a land occupier to persons entering the property by the status of the entrant. Because of the value attached to private land ownership, the law developed in a way that was highly protective of these interests.

 

            [A] Trespassers

 

A “trespasser” is one who enters or remains on the property in the possession of another without the permission (express or implied) of the land occupier. The duty owed to trespassers was (and in many ways remains) extremely limited.  The only obligation initially imposed on land possessors was to refrain from wilfully harming the trespasser. Courts expanded the duty owed to trespassers to include requiring warnings about “traps.” At the outset, the concept of “traps” was narrowly defined. More recently, courts have engaged in some creativity, adopting a broader interpretation of “trap.”

 

                        [1] Frequent or Known Trespassers

 

In most common law jurisdictions, the traditional rule has been altered in the case of known or frequent trespassers. Where a land occupier actually is aware of the presence of a trespasser and knows that the trespasser is approaching a non-evident artificial (human made) condition, the land occupier is obligated to warn the trespasser if there is danger of serious bodily harm or death. Also, if the land occupier is on notice of frequent trespassing, or has reason to know of such, an obligation to warn of hidden dangers known to the land possessor and risking serious injury or death may be imposed. No warning need be given of conditions on the land that a trespasser would be expected to discover or which are inherent in the use of the land. Further, the land occupier who knows of a trespasser's presence must use reasonable care for the protection of the trespasser in carrying on activities.

 

                        [2] Child Trespassers

 

The rules barring recovery for the majority of injured trespassing children caused discomfort for the courts. By the 1870s, courts began broadening the land possessor's duty to trespassing children in limited situations. This more lenient approach has become known as the “attractive nuisance doctrine.” Under the Restatement a child trespasser will be owed a duty of ordinary care if a judge balances several factors and finds that they support providing the child trespasser special treatment. [See Restatement § 339.]

 

            [B] Licensees

 

A licensee is someone who enters the land with the express or implied consent of the land possessor, as is the case with social guests. The licensee takes the property in the condition in which the land possessor uses it.  A land possessor may be liable to a licensee injured by a condition on the property where the land possessor knows of a dangerous condition on the property, fails to make the condition safe or to warn the licensee about the risk involved, and the licensee does not know about the danger nor would be expected to discover the dangerous condition. Where the presence of a licensee is known or should be known to the defendant, most jurisdictions require land possessors to use reasonable care in carrying out activities on the property.

 

            [C] Invitees

 

There are two primary types of invitees: business invitees and public invitees. Business invitees are on the premises for the potential financial benefit of the land occupier. Public invitees are on land held open to the public at large.  As to invitees, land possessors must use reasonable care in maintaining the premises and in their activities. This often entails taking affirmative steps to discover dangers on the property.  The obligation of the land possessor to an invitee then is one of reasonable care.

 

            [D] Determining Status

 

The determination of the plaintiff's status can be challenging, and has a profound impact on the plaintiff's ability to recover. Where there are disputed facts affecting the plaintiff's status, the jury ultimately decides the appropriate classification. Further, a plaintiff's status can change based on where she is at the time of her injury.

 

§ 9.03 A Unitary Standard [155-158]

 

A significant minority of states have rejected the common-law status approach. California was the first state to replace the status approach to land possessor liability with a generalized reasonable person standard. [See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).] Under this approach a duty of reasonable care is owed any land entrant regardless of status. Some jurisdictions have elected to take a middle approach of merging the licensee and invitee categories while retaining the trespasser classification. There is a significant litigation difference between the common-law approach and that of the generalized reasonableness standard: the unitary standard permits more cases to get to the jury than the status approach.

 

§ 9.04 Land Possessor Duty to Those Outside the Land [158-159]

 

The common law rule provides that a land possessor owes no duty to those outside the land for natural conditions on the land. Where harm is occasioned by an artificial condition or the land possessor's activity, however, a duty is recognized. Some jurisdictions have rejected the no-duty rule regarding natural conditions and have replaced it with a generalized duty of reasonable care.

 

§ 9.05 Landlord-Tenant Relations  [159-160]

 

Initially the law of property governed the landlord-tenant relationship and, because the lease was viewed as a complete conveyance of the property investing full control in the tenant during the duration of the leasehold, the lessor owed no tort duty to the lessee.  Now, all jurisdictions have come to recognize some or all of the following exceptions: common areas, negligent repairs, undisclosed dangerous conditions known to the lessor, lessor's covenant to repair, premises leased for admission to the public, and dangerous condition to persons outside the leased premises.  Most jurisdictions have required a plaintiff to fall within one of these recognized exceptions in order to establish a tort duty owing from the landlord. Some jurisdictions, however, have expanded landlord liability to the point that a landlord owes a duty of reasonable care to all on the land regarding conditions on the leased premises.

Chapter 10

DUTY LIMITED BY KIND OF HARM

 

§ 10.01 Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress [162-174]

 

            [A] Overview

 

Historically, tort law provided compensation for a victim's mental distress only when it followed physical injury. Recovery for this emotional upset, parasitic to the plaintiff's claim for physical harm, is typically known as “pain and suffering.” Now, in certain limited circumstances, negligently inflicted mental distress that does not follow from physical harm is recognized as a basis for recovery. Traditionally, as a prerequisite to recovery for mental distress, the defendant's negligence must have caused some form of physical impact on the plaintiff's person. Most states today only require that the plaintiff have been in risk of physical impact, sometimes referred to as being within the “zone of impact” or the “zone of danger.” Most states also require that the victim's mental distress be sufficiently severe to cause physical symptoms of the distress. Some jurisdictions have flirted with a much broader recovery for pure emotional distress – dispensing with a requirement of physical manifestations and broadly defining the class of proper plaintiffs.

 

A separate development has been the gradual recognition of bystander recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress. A majority of states allow a bystander to recover only if the bystander is also within the zone of physical risk. A significant minority of states now allow recovery for bystanders who are not in risk of physical impact if they (1) are physically near the accident; (2) have contemporaneous sensory perception of the accident; and (3) are closely related to the victim. Most of the states following this approach also continue to require that the bystander-plaintiff suffer some physical manifestation of her distress. 

 

            [B] Direct Actions

 

                        [1] The Impact Rule

 

A small minority of states retain the once generally held requirement that the victim must suffer physical contact by the defendant's negligence to recover successfully for mental distress. The impact need not itself cause physical injury. The few jurisdictions that continue to require impact on the plaintiff reason that the rule still reflects the clearest and most logical line for determining when mental distress should be compensated. The vast majority of jurisdictions, however, have abandoned the impact requirement, reasoning that its artificiality creates an incentive for overly creative pleading and excessive litigation as plaintiffs try to fashion new exceptions to the impact requirement.

 

                        [2] Risk of Impact Rule

 

A clear majority of American states allow recovery for mental distress if the plaintiff was at risk of physical impact and suffered a physical manifestation of the distress. This so-called “zone of danger” requirement allows the plaintiff to recover for mental distress caused by near misses. The majority rule continues to require physical manifestations of the mental distress. Classically this physical ailment was characterized as fright, although the term is no longer required. While a heart attack or miscarriage is clearly adequate, such severe physical manifestations are not required, and assertions of stomach trouble have sufficed.

 

                        [3] Special Cases

 

In limited situations, courts have been willing to relax the limitations on recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress. For example, a plaintiff can readily recover for mental distress occasioned by the negligent handling of a close relative's corpse, or the erroneous notification of a close relative's death, situations lacking either impact or a threat of physical danger to the plaintiff.

 

                        [4] Broadest Direct Recovery

 

A few jurisdictions moved toward permitting a broader recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress, employing general notions of foreseeability. In the place of restrictions such as impact or presence in the danger zone, these states permit recovery for mental distress to all foreseeable plaintiffs. Others have something of a middle ground, where a plaintiff suffering mental distress is owed a duty provided she can show the existence of a pre-existing duty. [See Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989).]

 

                        [5] Recovery for Fear of Future Physical Harm

 

A particularly challenging issue receiving increasing attention is whether emotional distress damages should be recovered for the fear of future physical harm. The problem often arises in the toxic tort or defective product context. Most courts are wary of permitting recovery due to the difficulty of measuring damages, potentially crushing liability, and serious proof problems such as the possibility of multiple causes.

 

            [C] Bystander Actions

 

Recovery for emotional distress suffered from the defendant's negligently inflicted harm to another has been particularly controversial. Courts have asserted various tests in an attempt to strike a balance between allowing the most foreseeable plaintiffs to recover for emotional distress without overly burdening negligent defendants.

 

                        [1] Zone of Danger

 

Courts have used the near-impact rule to compensate a bystander for the emotional trauma of witnessing a serious injury to a close relative. Under the zone-of-danger rule, the plaintiff can recover for emotional harm suffered from witnessing negligently inflicted harm causing death or serious injury to another (generally a close relative) when she is in a position to fear for her own safety.

 

                        [2] Dillon v. Legg: Minority Rule

 

A large minority of states have extended potential recovery to bystanders of an accident even though they were not at physical risk themselves. The Dillon v. Legg decision [441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968)], which led the movement away from the zone-of-danger test, articulated three factors needed to establish a duty to the plaintiff: (1) whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident . . . ; (2) whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident . . . ; (3) whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related. These “factors” have become subject to claims of arbitrariness, however, as courts have come to differing conclusions under similar fact patterns. Although courts disagree about the proper scope of recovery, there is a general concern that liability to bystanders flowing from a negligent act will create liability disproportionate to the defendant's fault. This concern has prompted some courts to discourage expansive findings of foreseeability. Indeed, there has been some recent movement toward narrowing bystander recovery even on the limited Dillon approach. [See, e.g., Thing v. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989), narrowing the reach of Dillon.] 

 

                        [3] Restatement Position

 

The Restatement endorses liability under § 436 if the plaintiff's mental distress results from the risk of impact, or “shock or fright at harm or peril to a member of his immediate family occurring in his presence,” and the plaintiff is in the zone of danger. Further, Restatement § 436A requires that the plaintiff suffer “bodily harm or other compensable damage.”

 

§ 10.02 Wrongful Conception, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life [174-180]

 

            [A] Overview

 

These cases are quite controversial because the plaintiffs are contending, in essence, that the birth of a child is a compensable harm. The defendant's negligence has not rendered a healthy child unhealthy. Had there been no fault, the child would not have been born at all. The terminology courts and commentators use in this area varies although most categorize the claims as follows: the parents' action for the negligently caused birth of a healthy child is a “wrongful conception” (or “wrongful pregnancy”) claim; the parents' claim for damages due to the negligently caused birth of an unhealthy child is a “wrongful birth” claim; and the child's own legal claim is one for “wrongful life.” Each of these will be examined in turn.

 

            [B] Wrongful Conception

 

Virtually all courts confronted with a “wrongful conception” claim have permitted some recovery, recognizing that the defendant's breach of the standard of care has led to foreseeable harm.  Without much controversy, plaintiffs are typically permitted to recover damages directly associated with the pregnancy and the birth.  Some courts also permit the recovery of emotional distress damages too.  Most courts have refused to permit the parents to recover the cost of raising the child to majority. 

 

When recovery is permitted, some courts require an offset based on the “benefit rule” embodied in the Restatement [§ 920], under which the jury is asked to reduce the damage award by the emotional gains of having a healthy child. Another torts damages principle that defendants have asserted in wrongful conception cases (as well as in wrongful birth cases discussed below) is the requirement that a plaintiff mitigate damages. Defendants have contended that the plaintiffs' failure to terminate the unwanted pregnancy or to put the child up for adoption constitutes a failure to mitigate damages. Courts, however, have been generally unwilling, in light of the highly personal nature of the decision involved, to permit jury consideration of the impact of the plaintiffs' decision to go to term and to keep the child.

 

            [C] Wrongful Birth

 

In wrongful birth actions, the plaintiffs are suing because the defendants' negligence deprived them of their ability to make an informed decision about whether to procreate, or whether to carry a potentially impaired child to term. In many instances, the plaintiff must show that “but for” the defendant's negligent failure to diagnose the condition giving rise to the birth defect, the plaintiff would have learned of the potential danger and would have elected to terminate the pregnancy.

 

The major debate centers around what damages should be recoverable. Most jurisdictions have permitted the wrongful birth plaintiff to recover extraordinary expenses associated with the defect with which the child was born. Some have also permitted recovery of emotional distress damages. The “benefit rule” may apply in the wrongful birth context. Some courts require the jury to reduce the plaintiff's damage recovery by the emotional benefits of having the child. The jury may deem these benefits substantial or minor depending on the condition of the child.  

 

            [D] Wrongful Life

 

A wrongful life action is the action of the infant born in an impaired condition, claiming, in essence, that being born was the injury. The great majority of jurisdictions have refused to recognize such a claim. A central reason for the rejection of a wrongful life claim is the difficulty calculating damages. Courts have found it impossible to apply conventional tort damage principles, by which the injured plaintiff is to be returned to a pre-injury state, in the wrongful life context because the wrongful life plaintiff's pre-injury state would have been non-existence. A few courts have permitted limited wrongful life recovery, allowing the wrongful life plaintiff to recover the extraordinary expenses associated with the impairment. No jurisdiction currently permits the wrongful life plaintiff to recover for pain and suffering. 

 

§ 10.03 Loss of Consortium, Wrongful Death, and Survival [180-188]

 

            [A] Overview

 

These claims deal with two kinds of compensable harm to certain family members arising from tortiously inflicted injury to another: loss of consortium and wrongful death. Loss of consortium and wrongful death are most appropriately viewed as a type of injury. As a duty issue, the debate focuses on who should be permitted to recover, as well as what should be recoverable.

 

            [B] Loss of Consortium

 

Nearly all jurisdictions permit one spouse to recover against a person who seriously injures the other spouse, usually calling it as an action for “loss of consortium.” The concept of “consortium” gradually expanded to permit recovery for more than the economic loss of the of the injured spouse's household services; now the loss of consortium plantiff is permitted to recoup intangibles such as loss of companionship, comfort, and sexual services. Some jurisdictions, still a minority, permit children to recover for the tortious injury to a parent and parents to recover for tortious harm to a child. Courts expanding consortium rights have noted the inconsistency of permitting a spousal action while denying an action by parents or children.

 

            [C] Wrongful Death

 

Every state has passed a statute that permits wrongful death recovery though the scope of that recovery varies state to state.

 

                        [1] Who May Recover

 

Under any wrongful death statute, the plaintiff is suing for loss suffered due to the tortiously inflicted death of a close relative. Because wrongful death is purely statutory, an action may be brought only by those permitted to do so pursuant to the jurisdiction's wrongful death statute. A surviving spouse, parents and children are typically permitted to bring an action. Some statutes exclude other possible dependents such as siblings or stepchildren who have not been legally adopted.

 

                        [2] Recoverable Damages

 

Initially nearly all wrongful death statutes limited wrongful death recovery to pecuniary (monetary) losses. Strictly interpreting the limitation to pecuniary losses led to minimal recovery for the death of the elderly, the young and those not working outside the home. Today, most jurisdictions permit designated dependents to recover lost support and other benefits arising from the tortious death.

 

                        [3] Proof Problems

 

Wrongful death recovery is never automatic, even by one clearly permitted to bring the action under a wrongful death statute. The plaintiff must prove with some degree of certainty the losses suffered from the tortious death. Calculating these damages can be extraordinarily challenging, such as when dealing with the death of a minor child.  

 

                        [4] Defenses

 

The effect of the wrongful death plaintiff's negligence or that of the decedent may affect wrongful death recovery.  In most jurisdictions, the action is treated as derivative of the underlying claim; thus, the deceased's fault affects the wrongful death heir's recovery.

 

            [D] Survival Actions

 

A survival action is the continuation of the decedent's action against the tortfeasor.  As such it does not give rise to new legal claims; it simply continues a pre-existing one. The action is brought by the administrator, executor or personal representative of the decedent's estate. As the continuation of the decedent's action, the representative can, in most jurisdictions, recover any damages that the decedent would have recovered if she had lived. Some jurisdictions limit what can be recovered in a survival action, however.

 

Virtually all jurisdictions permit both survival actions and wrongful death actions by statute. Where the tortious conduct contributes to the victim's death, often both actions are brought simultaneously. The survival action typically permits the estate to recover the decedent's medical expenses, lost wages and, perhaps her pain and suffering. The post-death losses are recoverable in the wrongful death action by the appropriate statutory heirs for the losses they suffer from the tortiously caused death. 

 

§ 10.04 Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss [188-200]

 

            [A] Overview

 

Where a defendant's negligence causes physical injury from which the plaintiff suffers economic loss (such as lost wages) or causes property damage from which flows economic harm (such as lost profits), there is no duty debate about recovery for economic loss. But where the defendant's unreasonable conduct has caused solely economic loss without physical injury or property damage, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions refuse to find a duty.

 

            [B] Pure Economic Loss

 

Under the general rule, there is no negligence recovery by those suffering purely economic losses. Courts have suggested several reasons to justify the no-duty rule: a concern about potential liability out of proportion to fault; a difficulty in measuring damages; a lack of deterrence flowing from the imposition of liability due to the unpredictable nature of the harm; the notion that it is preferable for plaintiffs to self-insure to protect themselves from the limited losses they suffer than to require the defendant to insure against potentially vast damage claims; and there is a benefit to litigants and to the tort system to have clearly defined, bright-line rules. While the rule is largely followed, it has been criticized as capricious and outdated. And at least one jurisdiction has adopted a broader rule creating a duty to “particularly foreseeable plaintiffs” who suffer pure economic loss. [See People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985).]

 

            [C] Liability of Negligent Information Suppliers

 

Much of the litigation in the economic loss arena has arisen in the context of negligent information suppliers, such as accountants. Notwithstanding strict limits on duty in the economic loss context generally, courts have recognized an exception where the plaintiff and defendant have a special relationship. Often this is evidenced by contract. The controversy in this economic loss context is the degree to which third parties harmed by the defendant's negligence are owed a duty. All courts recognize that duty in this context may extend beyond privity of contract. Yet there is great divergence beyond this point. Some courts enlarge duty beyond privity only minimally, while others support a far more expansive duty. Most courts have selected among three primary approaches: the narrowest, which extends a duty only to those who are virtually in privity with the defendant (“quasi-privity”); the middle approach, which extends a duty to those the defendant intended to influence [Restatement § 552]; and the broadest, which extends a duty to those who could be foreseeably injured.

 

            [D] Attorney Liability

 

The debate about the degree that a duty should extend beyond the client has also arisen in the context of legal malpractice. Courts have been reticent in the attorney context to expand a duty beyond privity of contract.

 

In most jurisdictions the rule remains that “absent fraud or other bad faith an attorney is not liable for negligent conduct to nonclient third parties.” Some jurisdictions have permitted a limited expansion of the duty beyond clients in certain particularly compelling circumstances, such as where there has been a negligently drafted will. See Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).